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BOOK REVIEWS

Introduction to philosophy, by W. JERUSALEM, translated by C. F. Sanders.
New York, The Macmillan Company, 1910. pp. VIII, 319.

An excellent compendium of the philosophical schools and theories, objective and impartial, yet with a clear platform of its own, is here made more accessible to American students. For completeness in historical orientation of the theories, and in exposition of their recent developments, we hardly know a better book. Its standpoint is empirical, practical, social, and devoted to common-sense. Judged as a text for beginners in this country, it seems to presuppose a more thorough general preparation and more mature habits of thought than one ordinarily finds in the American student; its greatest utility here would perhaps lie in its compendious character. For graduate students wishing a summary view it should be invaluable. Every problem is historically grounded, and the bibliographies are carefully prepared and well-balanced.

Jerusalem's philosophy "is characterized by the empirical view-point, the genetic method, and the biological and social method of interpreting the human mind" (p. vi). It is "rather close to pragmatism in epistemology," but gives "a further development of the pragmatic concept of truth" (p. vi). The following are typical phrases: "the airy realm of the transcendental," "come down to the level of reality," "understand life itself," "define its ideal and destiny" (p. vii). Philosophy is defined as "world theory," which is "obliged to keep in close touch with science," and "to construct the fragments, beyond which scientific investigation can never attain, into consistent, articulated system" (p. 2). Emotional and practical motives also play a part. Philosophy "should teach us to regard the world and life from nobler view-points" (p. 3). In its unity and in its study of the methods by which unity is gained, lies the distinction between philosophy and science (p. 14). Thus "the investigation of the foundations of knowledge" is philosophy's "most important task" (p. 15). But its field is very broad. It includes psychology and logic as *Propaedeutik*, epistemology, metaphysics, æsthetics, and ethics (including sociology),—all of which are to be studied historically as well as systematically.

The second division of the book, which deals with psychology and logic, limits itself mainly to the defining of the subject-matter of these two sciences. Psychology studies processes, not states; knows nothing of substance (soul); and is independent of metaphysics (p. 26), although contributory to the problem of knowledge, and to other problems (p. 40). The sections on logic, comprising the theory of judgment, are rather advanced reading, but they constitute an admirable summary.

The third division, "Criticism of Knowledge and Epistemology," traces the theories historically from naïve realism through Kantianism and idealism to the author's view, critical realism. Idealism, he finds, fails to account for social agreement; and since a universal consciousness is "psychologically practically inconceivable" (p. 82), critical realism alone remains. The discussion of epistemology includes sensualism, intellectualism (rationalism), mysticism and pragmatism. The author identifies modern mysticism (wrongly, in the opinion of the reviewer) with spiritism; and in his criticism of pragmatism, he seems to overlook its chief difficulty, *i. e.*, its failure to account for the need of knowledge for its own sake, apart from further consequences. The governing category of knowledge he

finds genetically to be "fundamental apperception," which seems to be Kant's "transcendental unity" with a psychological body (p. 108). This, as well as the more particular categories, is evolved by natural selection, in accordance with the pragmatic principle of useful adaptation to environment (p. 111). Abstract reasoning is the best substitute we can find, in the absence of concrete verifiability; this furnishes the origin of the apparent independence of logic (pp. 118-120). There is really no *a priori* knowledge (p. 123). On the whole, the discussion, although difficult for a beginner, is a masterpiece of logical arrangement and clearness.

The fourth division, "Metaphysics or Ontology," first discusses the ontological problem. Monism is either materialism, spiritualism (panpsychism), monism of being (Haeckel) or of becoming (Mach, Avenarius). The author doubts the conservation of energy in psychical process, and inclines to accept Wundt's "creative synthesis" (p. 147). Panpsychism is condemned (unfairly, we believe) as not accounting for the physical. The author is a dualist and an interactionist; he regards will as the type of causation (p. 181). Pluralism is less completely discussed than other topics, inasmuch as radical empiricism does not seem to be understood. Its attempt to defend plurality from the point of view of immediacy is not mentioned (p. 184). In his discussion of the cosmological problem the author follows Paulsen, in the main.

The fifth division treats of Aesthetics; and the sixth, of Ethics and Sociology. In the opinion of the author, indeed, ethics is sociology. Its subject-matter is not "deportment," but "volition" (p. 241), "the evaluation of an act in its social significance" (p. 265). Strangely enough, he brings the problem of freedom under ethics, rather than under metaphysics. He upholds *psychological* freedom, or the "absence of the feeling of external or internal constraint;" but denies metaphysical freedom, or the view that acts are "outside the law of causality" (p. 256). As to sociology, so much does he value it that he says "the sociology of the future . . . might well become the foundation of all philosophy" (p. 285).

From the "Concluding Reflections" many quotations might be cited to confirm our general estimate of the author's position. "Philosophy must return to the theory . . . of sound common-sense" (p. 293). "The ultimate object of knowledge is, after all, the preservation and improvement of life" (p. 300). Intellectualistic idealism is "an hypertrophy of the cognitive impulse" (p. 300). The universe is a vast will (pp. 306-307); and "the investigation of the laws of this divine will furnishes the sublime problem of all science" (p. 307). Is not this panpsychism? Or at least, is it not just a little above common-sense?

But, all criticisms apart, the book is a remarkable, and on the whole, a very just summary of philosophy. One finds it impossible, in a short review, to do justice to its historical perspective, and its logical arrangement of the problems. May it meet with the hearty welcome which it deserves.

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The Process of Abstraction: An Experimental Study, by THOMAS VERNER MOORE. University of California Publications in Psychology, 1, 2, 1910, pp. 73-197.

Following in the wake of the Würzburg school which has tried, during the past ten years, to study experimentally the higher thought processes, Moore attempts to determine experimentally the mental processes involved in the process of abstraction, or the formation of our general ideas. He seeks to discover how general ideas form and develop, and what mental processes are involved in their formation.

His method consisted in presenting to his subjects, a series of groups of geometrical figures so drawn and arranged that a common element constantly recurred in each group, while the other figures in the group were con-